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Scholarship, by its strict attention to accepted
methodologies, is superficially conservative of belief.
But its tone of mind leans towards a fundamental
negation. For scholars the reasonable topics in the
world are penned in isolated regions, this subject-
matter or that subject-matter. Your thorough-going
scholar resents the airy speculation which connects
his own patch of knowledge with that of his
neighbor. He finds his fundamental concepts
interpreted, twisted, modified. He has ceased to be
king of his own castle, by reason of speculations of
uncomfortable generality, violating the very grammar of his thoughts.
(Whitehead, 1961, p. 108)

A

lfred North Whitehead, a philosophical
contemporary and admirer of Dewey, cut straight
to the heart of why it is risky to ask historians of
philosophy such as myself to review the speculative, reconstructive
work of philosophers attempting to renew philosophical ideas of
the past for our present purposes. That is to say, I, in my historical
mode, turn blinders to a great deal of research (this is what
Whitehead means by “a fundamental negation”) in order to pay
close attention on a particular philosophical period. In my case, I
am a specialist in the history of American philosophy, from the philosophies of First Nation peoples and Puritan colonialists, to
classical American pragmatism and Boston personal idealism. I
recognize and accept that this scholastic attitude is a restriction on
myself. I have a conservative adherence to the lifeworld and aims of
Dewey in context of his own thought. Yet at the same time, as a
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good Deweyan, I believe all good history is
present-oriented (genealogical). Further, a
good Deweyan recognizes that philosophical
reconstructions of history have a special
license for creative reinterpretation in order to
better engage and meet the needs of the
present. Philosophers of education take this
call most seriously; philosophy is and has to
respond to the needs of people in their
development (education) in concrete experience. I am thus often conflicted when
approaching texts meant to engage a broad audience (beyond the
narrow needs of the historical scholar), wanting fidelity of interpretation on one hand while recognizing the need for new kinds of
stories and reconstructions on the other.
Walter Feinberg, as a leading philosopher of education, is all
too keenly aware of the need for a new “progressive education”
movement that continues Dewey’s reconstructive work without
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letting our adherence to past thought blind us from questioning
and reinterpreting Dewey’s ideas for our present purposes. In his
new book, Dewey and Education, Feinberg (2018) offers an
important, clear, and concise proposition. He offers a new Deweyan social imaginary for the present needs of educators, from
teachers, students, and administrators, to community organizers
and educational theorists. What understandably gets left by the
wayside sometimes is close care and attention to Dewey’s full
philosophical context. My task in this review then is to largely focus
on the power of Feinberg’s reconstruction of Dewey for education
today, and ways we might further advance it. At the same time, my
second authorial voice will leave signposts on the wayside for those
interested in thorough, nuanced, and careful attention to Dewey’s
own views embedded within his own context.
Feinberg (2018) begins his story by accounting in the preface
for his own engagement with Dewey. As an exemplary educational
reformer committed to questions of political life and social justice,
Feinberg has had a deep and sometimes critical relationship with
Dewey. His doctoral dissertation, A Comparative Study of the Social
Philosophies of John Dewey and Bernard Bosanquet, was concerned
with the questions of “social pluralism” and “political legitimacy”
(Feinberg, 2018, p. ix), a theme he has continued to explore
throughout his career. In so doing, he has expanded an area where
Dewey is often felt as lacking; how to include in one’s philosophy,
and in particular one’s philosophy of education, more nuanced
readings of how power often prohibitively limits certain people
from being considered legitimate actors in democratic life. In the
1970s, Feinberg did his own important historical work exploring
the foundations of 20th-century liberal education (Feinberg, 1974)
in order to better understand the successes and limits of liberal and
progressive education for our present needs today.
The stars shined brightly on Feinberg when he went to acquire
his graduate education at the philosophy department of Boston
University (BU). Under personalists like Peter Bertocci, and
Deweyans (his dissertation readers) like Marx Wartofsky and
Kenneth Benne, Feinberg was introduced to two figures who
would become important to him in his later work: Hegel and
Dewey. Feinberg’s department had been greatly shaped by three
generations of Boston personalism, though by the time he got
there, the department had already pluralized its specialties. Boston
personalism was not, as Feinberg put it, a movement that primarily
“[g]rew out of the Methodist Church (Feinberg, 2018, p. xv) and
was “concerned with the problem of evil” nor simply with explaining “why a benevolent God allowed evil to exist” (Feinberg, 2018,
p. xvii). Boston personalism is an American philosophical
tradition as old as pragmatism that is quite Hegelian in
nature, which shares a close methodological orientation with
radical empiricism (their method was often referred to as “rational
empiricism”). It was, in fact, a full philosophy, one that often
included a theology, but was much larger than that. To provide my
own (greatly simplified summary), personalists, including the
Boston school, think that the area of life we spend the most
attention and care on is the personal. From family, friends, and
romantic relationships, when someone says, “This is personal to
me,” they reveal what is of primary value in life. Given that the
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personal is what we value when we value, personalists think it is the
place to start one’s philosophy and life practice, and it suggests
something about the nature of the world we live in (though
personalists disagree with each other on just what exactly it
reveals). Boston personalism is unique for drawing on the same
roots as pragmatism, including many of its founders attending the
same “Metaphysical Club” discussions. Even in the case of its
theology, Boston personalism was often quite peculiar. For
example, in the case of E. S. Brightman (Martin Luther King Jr.’s
mentor at BU), it included an account of God as in time and finite,
but infinitely suffering and feeling alongside persons striving and
struggling for a better world. Its long-standing relationship with
pragmatism has been well explored and documented, with most of
the latter’s major figures, excluding Dewey, identifying as personalists (see Pihlström, 2004; Williams and Bengtsson, 2018). Pope
John Paul II himself was part of a long-standing tradition of
Catholic personalism and was in fact a well-regarded Max Scheler
(another personalist) scholar. The fact that both Martin Luther
King Jr. and John Paul II were personalists reveals in itself the full
significance of a point Feinberg makes about his own graduate
education: “In any event, it was clear that I was drawn to philosophy in part because I believe that ideas mattered in practice, and so
did a number of the BU Professors” (Feinberg, 2018, p. xvii).
Feinberg was part of a department and broader institution with a
long history of seeing philosophy (both personalist and pragmatist) as grounded and having a duty toward the concrete world of
human personal affairs. These departments, as with the pragmatists at the University of Chicago and the naturalists at Columbia
University, were critical in supporting and cultivating leaders like
Feinberg. They gave them the opportunity to support philosophy
as something that can “make a difference that makes a difference.”
Feinberg, even more than he suggests, is the legacy of a generation
of leaders in philosophy. As we shall see, his own views were largely
shaped by the transition from this older generation of scholars to a
younger one, putatively far more cynical about American political
life and social action.
In giving his own account of Dewey in the context of the older
“liberalisms” popular among philosophers such as his teachers at
BU, and as developing in the 20th century, Feinberg notes that
. . . Dewey did not accept the Marxist view that violent revolution was
the best way to achieve meaningful change, and his ideas on
education can be read in part as a response to Marx’s idea that the
proletariat through violent revolution would service as the agent of
effective advancement.” (Feinberg, 2018, xiii)

Here we get the first of several important strategic reinterpretations. As Cornel West and other philosophers and historians have
noted, Dewey never closely read, or really even properly skimmed,
the works of Marx (West, 1989). Further, Dewey, up through the
Pullman Strike in Chicago (1894) and World War I, had an
ambivalent relationship with the role of violence. Jane Addams was
one of many voices that shifted him in another direction. Nevertheless, in spirit, Feinberg points to something important: Dewey,
as in contrast with many critical theorists today, largely rejected
violence as an important ameliorative tool for cultural
book review

2

advancement. Dewey is in this sense a conservative, and the
Deweyan ameliorative spirit is deliberative, slow, and augmentative; he was also then not an optimist in the power of our reason
and free will to augment culture quickly (at least most of the time)
(see Vannatta, 2014). In further framing the liberalisms popular in
Dewey’s (and his own) generations, Feinberg notes that Dewey,
unlike the existentialists, never fully rejected “the basic assumption
of the Enlightenment that human knowledge was limitless . . .”
(Feinberg, 2018, p. xix). But as previously mentioned, Dewey’s
melioristic, largely nonviolent approach to social change was
grounded in his doubts about the limits of human reason. Perhaps
it would be better said that Dewey preferred to highlight the
capacity of humans to reconstruct richer democratic communities,
an emphasis that at times Feinberg rightly castes doubt upon. The
more important and general point Feinberg wants to make, and
that the historian of philosophy in me ought to listen to, is that
Dewey’s “optimism,” grounded in the social optimism of the
American social imaginary in the early 20th century, is no longer
tenable for us. I will come back to this point later; suffice to say it is
important to note that Dewey described his philosophy as “ameliorative” and not optimistic for a reason, one grounded in his
Hegelian antirationalist stand on the activity of reason. This stance
shaped his view of the philosopher’s normative role in society.
Another point on which the historian of philosophy in me
must respond to is on Louis Menand’s account of the origins of
pragmatism as arising “partly as a response to the massive destruction brought about by the Civil War” (Feinberg, 2018, p. xxii), on
which Feinberg relies. Although the statement itself is entirely
credible, it is worth noting that Menand far over emphasizes the
Civil War’s role in the formation of pragmatism. Menand’s work on
the subject, The Metaphysical Club (Menand, 2002), has been
thoroughly criticized in the classical American philosophy
scholarship (see Auxier, 2006; Juffras, 2001). Thus, although
Feinberg is right that the Civil War greatly shaped early American
philosophers, it is by no means the primary force in its inception.
Now, it is fair for Feinberg to generalize and place classical American pragmatism into a broader American narrative. But not
surprisingly, historical nuances get abstracted, glossed over, or
simply ignored. The inception of pragmatism in figures like C. S.
Peirce had largely philosophical origins, ones that had meaningful
implications for the post–Civil War world but that were not caused
by the war itself. Again, I find however that Feinberg’s overall point
is valid: America is neither politically nor philosophically in the
mood of reconstruction as it was after the Civil War. Civic culture
is constantly being undermined, and we are on the brink of
ecological collapse. The mood is not one that can easily be identified with a “rebuilding” of social imaginary (at least not yet), which
pragmatism utilized to its great advantage.
Despite my scholarly and sometimes pedantic quibbles, I
think the book is timely and important. Feinberg offers a critical,
nuanced, and approachable usage of Deweyan philosophy toward a
“new progressive education” movement. As Dewey did in his
Democracy and Education, Feinberg adeptly frames the very
project of the book in his own description of the purpose of
philosophy of education: “This is why, as I have suggested
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elsewhere, philosophy of education is first and foremost a street
philosophy. It begins, as Dewey would note, with the felt needs and
common concerns that develop out of the everyday experiences of
people” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 2). Feinberg’s task in the book is to
explore what ideas of Dewey’s might serve the common experiences and concerns of people today, especially in terms of their
own (educational) development. His chapter one, “Introduction,”
outlines his project in the book: to offer a clear vision of Dewey’s
philosophy, and educational theory and practice, selecting aspects
of Dewey’s work and highlighting perceived weaknesses in the
effectiveness of Dewey’s ideas for today, including, for example, as
they participated in the 19th century’s naïve scientific, progressive
optimism and blind loyalties. His work is a sort of philosophical
and personal genealogy of where Deweyan progressive ideas and
education have been and where they ought to go to serve as a
“street philosophy.”
Feinberg expands on the origins of what might be called
Dewey’s own “street philosophy” in chapter two, “Influences
on Dewey and the Development of Pragmatism.” He starts the
chapter by highlighting that
. . . Dewey was more than an armchair philosopher or a disconnected
educational theorist, and he was much more than a pundit. He was,
perhaps more than any of these, even before the term was coined, a
public intellectual who took on the issues of his day, such as war,
depression and immigration, addressing them in the popular media as
well as in academic publications. He was a philosopher who was
willing to get his hands dirty and enter into the fray of political and
social debate. And get his hands dirty he surely did. (Feinberg, 2018,
p. 15)

Feinberg is a good reader of Dewey’s philosophy, especially its
Hegelian and Darwinian elements, and how Dewey reconstructed
those philosophies for his own purposes (see, for example,
Feinberg, 2018, pp. 19–20). He also offers a clear and respectable
account of James’s and Peirce’s influence on Dewey, though much
more obviously could be said, especially about the influence of
Peirce on Dewey’s later works.
The heart of the book can be found in chapter three, “Dewey’s
Philosophy,” and chapter four, “Dewey on Education,” which are
expertly written, showing the skill and sensitivity of a senior
Dewey scholar. In “Dewey’s Philosophy,” Feinberg traces the
all-too-often ignored but essential thread to understanding
Dewey’s philosophy: “The idea of meaning links the disparate
elements of his philosophy” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 39). Unlike most
modern takes on Dewey, with tired arguments trying to bend and
warp Dewey to fit the narrow needs of analytic epistemology,
leading to endless and unhelpful arguments about Dewey’s theory
of truth, Feinberg goes to what is at the heart of Dewey’s work
(even his logic): the creation, development, and intensification of
meaningful experiences for human creaturely life. “A major task
of Dewey and other pragmatists is to understand how confusion
turns to meaningful order, not only for infants, but for all of us. For
Dewey, we understand the meaning of something, we see its
connection to other things and to a human purpose” (Feinberg,
2018, p. 40). This task includes not only reflecting on the human
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ability to bring meaningful order to living in and with the world
but teasing out what the human ability to coordinate meaning tells
us about the nature of the world. Knowing the role of meaning as a
part of nature undergirds Dewey’s most central work: “Dewey is
most interested in the function of meaning in expanding the
control and predictability of human experience and in enabling
people to control the connection between an event and the
enjoyment or suffering that follows from that event” (Feinberg,
2018, p. 52). In other words, Dewey was interested in helping us
find a receptive engagement with our natural environment so
that we can learn how to live ever more meaningfully with and
through it.
Throughout this chapter, Feinberg adroitly articulates for a
broad audience some of the complex nuances of Dewey’s philosophy. He leads us from Dewey’s use of radical empiricism and
theory of conceptual formation, to his ecological standpoint and
moral theory. He also explores how Dewey might be compared
to modern theorists, from Chomsky to Rawls. That said, I again
must mention a quibble. It is a shame that Feinberg does not
reference Dewey’s 1932 Ethics (Dewey, 1987) in his section on
Dewey’s moral philosophy, as I believe it best speaks to the kinds of
criticisms Feinberg gives of his ethics, such as that Dewey commits
a mild version of the naturalistic fallacy1 (Feinberg, 2018, p. 61).
Again, despite my small protestations, Feinberg’s overall point still
stands its ground: that Dewey’s progressivist narrative of social
progress does not well fit our own social imaginary (Feinberg,
2018, p. 69).
In chapter four, “Dewey on Education,” besides going over
Dewey’s normative view of what the school ought to be for society
in his time and running through a number of important Deweyan
distinctions between education and schooling, Feinberg contextualizes Dewey within not only the progressive education movement
but the state of education at the time Dewey wrote his work. He
reminds us that Dewey started writing about education before it
was compulsory in all U.S. states and as it was just beginning to
adjust to the industrial age. In a time when more and more
Americans moved from rurally rooted communities or immigrated from Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere to uprooted American city life, Dewey thought the school had a special contextual
role to play. For “Dewey feared too that without an educational
transformation, children would not develop a meaningful connection to a larger community, and that subject matter taught just for
its own sake without regard to their real-life function would be too
abstract to be meaningful” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 75). The role of the
school was, in an industrial society, to provide the soil for meaningful growth, a role once played by largely agrarian community
settings and now that could be catalyzed by the opportunity for
conjoint communication across difference in diverse city life. The
school was to be a site for meaning making by and through our
1 One might also look at Dewey’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy
(and why he moved beyond it) in Democracy and Education (Dewey,
2008a, pp. 97–99) where he surveyed the 19th century’s turn to naturalism (Dewey, 2008a). For a thorough defense of Deweyan moral philosophy see Pappas, 2008.
democracy & education, vol 27, n-o 2

differences. It would be a site for the transformation of education,
society, and culture at large. Feinberg fairly points out that
although we still have warrant to see the school as a site of social
change, there is now ever more reason to question whether it can
be the central source for much needed cultural transformation.
Feinberg then takes us through a good review of what primary
schools were like in Dewey’s day, and what Dewey’s Laboratory
School at the University of Chicago aimed to do in light of that
situation.
In order to illuminate how Dewey’s educational theory was
meant to work in the new school as “social center” of industrial
society, Feinberg offers a variety of helpful examples, from personal
stories in the classroom and of learning to ski, to reflecting on the
movie Hidden Figures. Through such examples, he carefully covers
important nuances in Dewey’s approach to education. For
example:
Once in the 1980s when I was doing research in Japan, I visited an
English class in a high-pressure Japanese cram school that helps
students pass the entrance examination for a high-prestige university.
The class had about 300 students, all men, each one sitting in a neat
row with the teacher, almost invisible, behind a high podium in the
front of the room. Most all of the class was conducted in Japanese,
except for a few English phrases that the instructor muttered once in a
while, for example: “Step in the bus”; “step out of the car.” I doubt
whether the students were learning more than a technical
understanding of arcane features of grammar. The contrast was a
small class of a dozen or so women training to be lower-level
secretaries or travel agents. Their classroom was nicely carpeted and
cozy, and the students were all engaging in discussing in English an
American novel. These students were not only learning English. There
were also learning to appreciate it as a mode of expression and
communication. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 86)

One of the nuances of Dewey’s approach to education that this
example suggests is that the point of what is now called student-
centered education for Dewey was not that students controlled
curriculum and that the teacher had no expertise in guiding the
subject matter in relation to student interest. Rather, it was meant
to point out that “[t]he teacher needs to understand the logic of the
subject, but not just from the point of view of the expert, but also
from the logic and interest of the students” (Feinberg, 2018, p. 87).
The point is not to pontificate on one’s expertise but for it to serve,
as it did for the small classroom of women Feinberg visited (at least
from what he could gather from such a cursory visit to a classroom
culture he was not familiar with as an American), students’ lived
engagement and development with the material. The teacher is
centered on the growth of the students in finding the meaning of
English as a mode of expression and communication for their lives,
not on having the students amass linguistic information.
Despite these concrete examples, Feinberg does sometimes
err toward overintellectualizing Dewey’s philosophy. In some of
these cases, a closer reading of Dewey’s pragmatic forbearers
would clarify some misconceptions. For example, Feinberg claims
that “Dewey does not say a great deal about how doubt is developed except to note that it arises out of a problematic situation, but
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it is unlikely that doubt just arises naturally. Problematic situations
have to be recognized as problematic before doubt occurs”
(Feinberg, 2018, p. 88). Dewey does try to substantiate and
articulate how doubt works as a sign of a problematic situation,
which arises naturally, in works as varied as Democracy and
Education and Experience and Nature (Dewey, 1981, chs. 1–2).
He also clearly drew on Peirce’s own account of doubt as in the
Fixation of Belief (Peirce, 1877). As that work makes clear, doubt
does, in fact, occur naturally all the time and without being fully
recognized and utilized by our intelligence. I walk out the door,
and I trip on the first step out of the house. I then take two steps
forward to regain my balance. Now, I might be too busy to think
about it and recognize it in a way that would avoid future tripping
situations. I also might attribute it to the work of fate vying against
me. After all, my horoscope said I would hurt myself today. I might
in such a way fix (as in stabilize or put in place) the belief and arrest
the doubt. For Peirce and Dewey, doubts are not merely cognitive
recognition of a problem in such a way as to fix it. Yes, doubt does
incite intellectual reaction, but I could fix my belief in all sorts of
dogmatic ways in order to continue my passive habits of walking
out the door. I could then continue to trip several times a week on
that step.
Feinberg’s point is that for “. . . education to advance, satisfaction must be destabilized to a certain extent. Here is where the
teacher’s role as a bridge between the novice and the expert comes
into play. Part of the function of teaching is to destabilize satisfaction by encouraging the student to explore the limitations of the
practice that brings satisfaction (Feinberg, 2018, p. 88). A bigger
implication is that we (Dewey included) are prone to miss problematic aspects of the world unless we challenge ourselves (and our
students) to recognize them as real problems. We all too easily
dismiss our doubts about uneasy topics, like cultural injustice, and
let ourselves continue to be satisfied with our current practices.
Systematic racism in the form of the U.S. prison industrial complex
might not be recognized as a problem for those in privilege. Thus, it
can go on being a problem only for minority communities
entrapped by it, who really experience it, and not for others who
can go about their daily affairs while being able to maintain all sorts
of blinders to it and perhaps even reaping the rewards of the
practice. But here is just the point for the pragmatist: We have all
sorts of problematic situations that we fix with dogmatic judgments, or have not responded to with our full intelligence in other
ways, or that are not “live” events for us as we have not rubbed up
against them in significant ways. The challenge is not simply to
intellectually recognize a problematic situation but to help students
“rub against” it as a real problem, and as the kind of problem that
needs intelligence to arrest the doubt.
My point is to underscore the difference between having
students talk about problems, let us say, bullying in school, versus
having them as a community of inquiry feel it for themselves and
then see if they can reduce it in their school. Here is where diversity
is essential for the pragmatist. Without students with live experiences of bullying and teaching other students how to be receptive
to that experience as “live” and “real,” the experience has no
opportunity to become of meaningful use to all. Diversity is
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essential for advancing knowledge, and that is just what Dewey
hoped a diverse school would do for the previously homogenous
communities of late-19th-and early-20th-century America. In
such classrooms, students will not simply recognize but learn to
experience a more distant problem from their lived experience as
still live and real, and hit the resistance of experience when
attempting to ameliorate it. They will hit what Peirce called the
“secondness” of the world. The world as filled with troublesome
facts. Just telling other kids bullying is bad is not enough for
the world of fact: what kids do despite what their peers tell them.
Here is a chance for intelligence. The trick is to support the
students in not falling back on dogmatic ways to fix their
beliefs. Here is where Feinberg is right on point: We do not just
want to make students problem-solvers but intelligent/good
problem-solvers.
Feinberg goes over many other important topics throughout
the book, including Dewey’s conception of Democracy, challenges
to it, and what we might take from it today. Overall, the same
important larger problematic is repeated: Dewey’s social imaginary
does not fit our age of distrust and does not dig deeply enough into
the systematic problems that will get ignored by privileged
democratic groups.
The book culminates in chapter five, “Toward a New Progressive Educational Movement.” In his own reconstruction of Dewey’s
philosophy, Feinberg “. . . suggests ways in which a renascent
progressive education could contribute to the construction of
those habits of mind and character . . .” (Feinberg, 2018,
p. 103), which are, as he quotes from Dewey directly, “to aid in
producing . . . the intellectual and moral patterns, that are somewhat near even with the actual movement of events” (Feinberg,
2018, as quoted on p. 103). In other words, how can we use Dewey
to initiate a new educational movement that can democratically
reconstruct the present for a better future? For Feinberg, Dewey’s
participation in a social imaginary of optimistic social progress,
trust in American democratic national identity (and at least
somewhat in the state), and faith in the ability of the school
(broadly construed) to be the central force of social reconstruction,
was always problematic, and is now no longer a “live option” for a
revitalized progressive education movement. He also points to
ongoing concerns with Dewey’s view of diversity and American
homogenization and his inadequate attention to (and sometimes
even silence on) questions of race, gender, and identity.
The vision we get is of an optimistic philosopher, with painful
blinders given his privilege, who held a social imaginary that is no
longer helpful for our needs. Since the 1960s, Feinberg believes we
have moved from a social imaginary of optimism to one of
suspicion. For Feinberg, this transition is no mere historical
description—it is something he lived through as a young person
and later as an academic committed to activism.
This was the real dividing point between Dewey’s generation and
those that followed mine. I was in the middle, having internalized
much that Dewey had also internalized—the promise of public
education for a more inclusive, more democratic society, and yet I was
also standing outside of Dewey’s generation and questioning much
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that it took for granted—including the belief that schooling could
achieve greater equality by itself. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 111)

To flesh out his point about what we need to leave behind in
Dewey, in the middle of the chapter, he adeptly brings us to a piece
of personal biography. This brief section is about his first reading,
and his views today, on Dewey’s participation in the Polish Study, a
study of the loyalty of a Polish community in Philadelphia to the
U.S. during World War I (Feinberg, 2018, pp. 114–115). Feinberg
rightly criticizes Dewey’s misplaced trust in the American government’s motivations for war and his participation in the study that
put at risk this community of immigrants. It was not as if everyone
was duped by the sinister elements of the war. Other more “suspicious” pragmatists, like Dewey’s student Randolph Bourne, were
critical of the war from the beginning and had it out with Dewey in
public debates. Dewey, with full blinders on, supported a disastrous war. It is this kind of optimism (in line with an optimistic
social imaginary of solidarity) that Feinberg thinks we can do
without.
While Feinberg certainly thinks we should adopt Dewey’s
approach to practicing philosophy of education, and his approach
to the relationship between thought and action, Feinberg also
thinks we should be more mindful and critical of the unjust
behavior of society at large, all while being open to more confrontational and less academic, community-based responses to the
problematic situations of social life. Further, Feinberg thinks we
should have no illusions that the formal school can, by itself, be the
site of social progress. The point is to reuse Dewey toward a
broader and messier method of progressive education reform. This
conclusion is entirely warranted and indeed is duly pragmatic. As
Feinberg notes of his own work: “My criticism of Dewey is itself a
part of the pragmatic tradition. It aims to bring together our
deepest understanding of democracy, with the facts of social life as
we experience them.” (Feinberg, 2018, pp. 120–121)
But what then does this new progressive education movement
look like?
A new progressive education would recognize structural and
systematic inequality and promote more equitable distribution of
power. The idea of a new progressive education has three interrelated
dimensions. First it has a political dimension. Students would
understand the ways in which benefits are developed and
distributed in American Society. Second, it has a creative dimension.
Students would develop the ethical and aesthetic capacity to imagine
alternative realities. Third it has an academic dimension. Students
would develop the scientific, communicative and the political skills
that promote agency and fulfillment. (Feinberg, 2018, p. 120)

Feinberg questions whether we should even call this movement
“progressive education” or if that term too needs to be let go of in
the new reconstruction. In the last sections of the chapter, he offers
a few varied examples of small steps we might take in this direction. He rightfully draws on the work of Meira Levinson as a model
of how to address the civic empowerment gap and the kind of
training and community-based projects that might build political
skills and cultivate student agency. One also might think of the
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civic studies “public achievement” model as another example of the
new progressive education movement Feinberg envisions. Public
Achievement is an international civic education and empowerment initiative founded by Harry Boyte in which young people,
faculty, community members, and parents work together on
community problems and projects to “build the commonwealth”
(see Boyte, 2018).
Although the examples are helpful, the reader is left with
other lurking questions. Just how is this new progressive education
to get off the ground, and what role does Dewey as theorist, public
intellectual, and model play in that organizing effort? If we need to
reconstruct Dewey’s praxis in order to build this movement, and
even if, à la Whitehead, it makes us historians of philosophy
uncomfortable, what should we draw upon?
I end with an anecdotal note. On good authority, a word-of-
mouth insight has been handed down by several generations of
Deweyans to me. It has been told that John Herman Randall said
that Dewey exaggerated his optimism in his published work
because he felt he had a duty to the public to put a hopeful face on
things. This anecdote fits well with what Dewey said about the
place of the melioristic attitude in philosophy:
After all, the optimism that says that the world is already the best
possible of all worlds might be regarded as the most cynical of
pessimisms. If this is the best possible, what would a world which was
fundamentally bad be like? Meliorism is the belief that the specific
conditions which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or
comparatively good, in any event may be bettered. It encourages
intelligence to study the positive means of good and the obstructions to
their realization, and to put forth endeavor for the improvement of
conditions. It arouses confidence and a reasonable hopefulness as
optimism does not. For the latter in declaring that good is already
realized in ultimate reality tends to make us gloss over the evils that
concretely exist. It becomes too readily the creed of those who live
at ease, in comfort, of those who have been successful in obtaining this
world’s rewards. Too readily optimism makes the men who hold it
callous and blind to the sufferings of the less fortunate, or ready to find
the cause of troubles of others in their personal viciousness. It thus
co-operates with pessimism, in spite of the extreme nominal
differences between the two, in benumbing sympathetic insight and
intelligent effort in reform. It beckons men away from the world of
relativity and change into the calm of the absolute and eternal.
(Dewey, 2008b, pp. 181–182)

Perhaps Dewey was then not so caught up in an optimistic social
imaginary as Feinberg would have us believe. Rather, he wanted to
lure people to the “reasonably hopeful” through his own work as a
philosopher, so they could empower themselves to harness the
ameliorative potential in any situation. On this view, philosophy’s
job is, even if it makes us suspicious sometimes, to incite us to
address intelligently our most pressing problems. Feinberg’s work
offers just such an incitation, one Dewey himself, I think, would be
pleased with as reasonably hopeful. A new educational movement
that addresses our present needs might learn from Dewey that the
reasonably hopeful is needed to lure us toward the better. We can
be thoughtfully suspicious, but we ought to also fortify ourselves in
book review
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our philosophies with the strength to change what we can change
in our present situation.
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